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Macaulay: Notes on the Margins of Lawyering, in Three and a Half Minutes

NOTES ON THE MARGINS OF LAWYERING,
IN THREE AND A HALF MINUTES
Stewart Macaulay*
Mitu Gulati and Robert E. Scott have given us a wonderful study.,
They tell us about how elite lawyers practice law, and they tell us about
the transformation of the process of producing all of the standard form
contract terms that govern so much of our economic life.2 Moreover,
those of us who have done work involving interviewing lawyers can
understand what it took to produce this work. One reason that law
professors know so little about what lawyers for major economic actors
do is that these lawyers are so hard to study. I confess that most of what I
know about sovereign debt I learned reading this study. It is not my
world. The authors caution about not over-generalizing because things
may be different in other areas.3 Nonetheless, I want to speculate about
what the changes in elite practice may mean for other areas of creating
contracts and dealing with disputes that are likely to follow. I also want
to say something about the methods of studying lawyers.
I.

SOME COMMENTS SUGGESTED BY GULATI AND SCOTT'S STORY

Gulati and Scott show that law practice aimed at large corporations
has changed and will change more.4 We can ask what computers and
limits on what clients will pay may mean for our thinking about standard
form contracts. I would like to see studies of elite practice in other areas,

* Malcolm Pitman Sharp and Theodore W. Brazeau Professor Emeritus of Law, University
of Wisconsin Law School; A.B. 1952, LL.B 1954, Stanford University. Professor Macaulay has
taught contract law at the University of Wisconsin Law School since 1957. Professor Macaulay has
conducted empirical studies of lawyers and is the co-author of LAW IN ACTION: A SOCIO-LEGAL
READER (2007), a leading book on the sociology of law.
I. See generally MITU GULATI & ROBERT E. SCOTT, THE THREE AND A HALF MINUTE
TRANSACTION: BOILERPLATE AND THE LIMITS OF CONTRACT DESIGN (forthcoming 2012) (on file
with the Hofstra Law Review).
2. See id. (manuscript at 18-19).
3. See id. (manuscript at 180).
4. Id. (manuscript at 137-39).
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asking what the changes will mean for contract planning and dispute
resolution.
There are several stories about positive contributions of corporate
lawyers in American legal history. Willard Hurst, for example, saw
American lawyers in the nineteenth century as "social inventors." 5
Lawyers "contrived or adapted institutions (the corporation), tools (the
railroad equipment trust certificate), and patterns of action (the
reorganization of corporate financial structure or the fashioning of a
price structure for a national market)." 6 He continued: "Much, if not
most, of lawyers' inventions consisted in making old institutions serve
new needs. Obviously that did not derogate from the practical
to the contrary, it placed it in the normal
importance of their work;
7
change.",
social
pattern of
Spencer Kimball studied insurance in Wisconsin from 1835 to
1959.8 He found that courts regulated the administration of insurance
claims by using such doctrines as substantial performance and waiver,
while construing insurance contracts most strongly against the drafter. 9
Insurance company lawyers read the cases and responded: "[Ilndustry
committees frequently made drafting suggestions for making the
contracts so airtight that even a judge with a strong bias against
insurance companies could not misunderstand."'10 While there were
limits to what could be accomplished merely by changing the words in
insurance policies, the lawyers clearly were on top of what the courts
were doing.
Lawyers for wealth and power long have claimed to influence their
clients in positive ways. In the 1970s, there was much concern with
public interest law. A former corporate lawyer argued in the Wall Street
Journal that large-firm lawyers engage in real "public interest work" in
their everyday practice.1 1 They do this by suggesting ways that major
businesses can accomplish what they desire safely within legal restraints:
Because [business lawyers] advise powerful public and private entities,
these lawyers have a more consistent impact on the lives of American
5. JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW: THE LAW MAKERS 335-36
(1950).
6. Id. at 337.
7. Id.
8. See generally SPENCER L. KIMBALL, INSURANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY: A STUDY IN THE
LEGAL IMPLEMENTATION OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC PUBLIC POLICY, BASED ON WISCONSIN
RECORDS 1835-1959 (1960) (discussing Kimball's study of insurance in Wisconsin).

9. See id. at 209-13.
10. Id. at 211.
11. Stanley I. Hanover, Corporate Lawyers Do Public-Interest Work, WALL ST. J., Feb. 23,
1984, at 28.
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citizens than other types of counsel. The typical company seeks their
advice to avoid future costly legal battles. Yet, by advising a company
of the legal parameters within which it must operate, the business
attorney necessarily serves as guardian of the public interest. He has
the daily responsibility of ferreting out and making certain his client
honors the myriad of pollution, pension,
occupational safety, securities
2
and other laws that protect the public.
Gulati and Scott's study makes me wonder to what extent, if at all,
these stories of the functions of the elite bar still hold true today in areas
other than sovereign debt. The authors explain most of what they
uncovered by noting the "deficiencies in the organizational structure of
law firms, including hourly billing and compensation, the secondary role
given to [research and development], and the manner in which legal
services are marketed."' 13 It is not obvious why things would be different
outside of the sovereign debt area. A lot remains to be explored.
The authors' title is The Three and a Half Minute Transaction. The
reference to a "three and a half minute" contract comes from a lawyer's
response to their questions about the apparent failure of the sovereign
debt bar to deal with pari passu14 clauses:
You have to understand the system. No one pays that much attention to
the minute details like this ....The firm has a computer program. You
know... one that a junior associate can go to and plug the relevant
parameters into-you know, type of issuance, type of issuer, which
side we are representing, etc.,-and the computer generates a standard
contract. The firm spent [a large amount] on putting together this
system. Associates can now produce a contract for one of these deals in
three and a half minutes. This is the future of contracting in these
markets.' 5
Computers churning out standard forms is not a picture limited to
contracts in the sovereign debt arena. I first came across the idea in a
treatise written by a former general counsel of the Motorola Corporation
("Motorola"). He argued that "knowledge reuse" is:
[T]he creation of a system which anticipates virtually every document
and opinion drafting need, assembles every form and clause
conceivably used in the legal organization's experience, verifies
quality at the point of input, protects the data base from unauthorized
alteration, acts as an exhaustive checklist for issues and positions, helps

12.
13.
14.
15.

Id.
GULATI & SCOTT,supra note I (manuscript at 181).
Id. (manuscript at 21).
Id. (manuscript at 16) (alteration in original) (emphasis omitted).
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maintain organization policy, keeps organizational consistency, avoids
"re-inventing the wheel," slashes cycle time from hours to minutes, and
what was heretofore lawyer's work to
makes it possible to delegate
6
lower cost non-lawyers.'
Kenneth A. Adams tells us "[d]ocument assembly software is likely
to play a significant role in the future of contract drafting."' 7 He stresses
its benefits:
You can start each transaction afresh, without being limited by choices
made for previous transactions. You're assured a measure of firm-wide
consistency, in that first drafts of a given kind of contract are created
from the same pool of preloaded language. The questionnaire includes
guidance that explains the implications of the choices offered, so the
drafter is provided training when it's most valuable-while the
contract is being drafted. And answering an online questionnaire takes
a fraction of the time eaten up by the traditional process, so lawyers
and assisting in
can devote more
8 of their time to determining strategy
negotiations.'
While we can see the virtues of this kind of standardization, the
system rests on some assumptions that will not always be true. Most
obviously, those who make contracts for a corporation have to use the
wonderful computerized contract system. My late wife was a lawyer and
she represented a client who sued Motorola. In her case, a Motorola
executive wrote his own contract document, and he did not clear it with
the legal department before it was signed.' 9 The second point also is
obvious but easy to overlook. The first law of computers tells us garbage
in, garbage out. One key point in the Motorola general counsel's treatise
is that presumably someone with skill "verifies quality at the point of
input., 20 Perhaps Motorola's legal department was willing to invest in
research and development at the point of input. Perhaps Gulati and
Scott's informant who told them about the "three and a half minute"
contract worked at a firm that had invested in vetting each comma,
phrase, and paragraph in the database. However, apparently the firm had
not dealt adequately with the pari passu clause.2' It was a "minute
16. 1 RICHARD H. WEISE, REPRESENTING THE CORPORATE CLIENT: DESIGNS FOR QUALITY
ch. 7, at 7-1 (Supp. 1992).
17. Kenneth A. Adams, The New Associate and the Future of Contract Drafting, N.Y. L.J.,
Apr. 1, 2011, at 4, 7.
18. Id.
19. See Professor Peter Linzer's discussion of Shore v. Motorola, No. 98-4227, 2000 WL
51143 (7th Cir. Jan. 18, 2000), in Peter Linzer, Rough Justice: A Theory of Restitution and Reliance,
Contracts and Torts, 2001 Wis. L. REv. 695, 764-72.
20. 1 WEISE, supra note 16, at 7-1.

21. See GULATI & ScoTr, supra note 1 (manuscript at 21).
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detail." Some law firms and corporate legal departments just might have
scanned their firm's existing standard forms into their database. This
would have avoided any risk of offending senior partners or counsel who
had drafted part or all of them. In the short run, it would be relatively
inexpensive. However, again to state the obvious, putting a poorly
drafted clause on a computer does not by some miracle revise the
provision into clarity.
Moreover, the story of the pari passu clause reminds us of another
obvious point. Even if the quality of each provision in the database was
high when the system was created, the world changes in ways that are
hard to anticipate. Perhaps most judicial interpretations of standard
contract provisions are more or less predictable, but appellate courts now
and then do surprise lawyers. Coping with changing conditions would
require an investment that is not built into these systems. Gulati and
Scott stress that transaction planners do not spend much time keeping up
with judicial decisions interpreting standard form contracts.22 A large
firm's litigation specialists read cases, but they do not regularly
communicate with the planners. I can imagine the legal department in a
corporation such as Motorola assigning to a lawyer the task of following
judicial decisions and bringing them to the attention of those in charge of
the database. However, just as is true in a large firm, a corporation such
as Motorola has a limited budget. It would have to decide that it would
pay to invest in keeping its database up to date. Perhaps I am wrong, but
this does not sound to me like high prestige work. Of course, transaction
planners have many sources that sometimes will alert them to new cases.
There are journals and now even blogs on the Internet aimed at these
lawyers. Various forms of continuing legal education are widely
available, and sometimes they are focused on new developments relevant
to such lawyers. Moreover, many corporations are members of trade
associations. Some of these associations watch legal developments and
even offer suggested language to deal with cases, statutes, administrative
regulations, or events in the world that might affect what a standard form
attempts to govern.2 3
The "three and a half minutes" to create a sovereign debt contract
story seems to assume that the law firm could produce a contract

22. Id. (manuscript at 10).
23. See, e.g., Donna Valentine, Force Majeure-Planning for the Unexpected, EXCEL
MEETINGS & EVENTS, http://www.excelmeetings.comabout/documents/Force.Majeur_-09.pdf (last

visited Mar. 1, 2012). The newsletter offers a model force majeure clause designed to reverse such
cases as Kuhn Farm Machinery, Inc. See 7200 Scottsdale Rd. Gen. Partners v. Kuhn Farm Mach.,
Inc., 909 P.2d 408, 418 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that a convention organizer was not excused
from a contract to hold a convention because travelers feared flying during the Gulf War).
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document without too much concern for the views of those on the other
side. John Flood stresses that there are customs about which side drafts
the documents in different types of transactions: "[W]hoever originates
the documentation has considerable control over its life course and final
composition., 24 While this control may exist, the other side often will
want some clauses revised, some provisions added, or both. Perhaps a
lawyer could get a draft of an opening proposal into the dance of
negotiation. Perhaps the person who decided which standard form
provisions would become part of the database may have edited them
nicely. However, changes often introduce uncertainty. It is far too easy
to add, say, a new clause twenty-five that was drafted by the other side,
but then to overlook that it is not entirely consistent with the existing
clause ten. Sometimes such an inconsistency will only become apparent
when engineers, general contractors, or others run into trouble trying to
perform terms negotiated by lawyers, purchasing agents, sales people, or
those expert in finance.
Claire Hill has written several articles dealing with the contracts
drafted by lawyers. 25 She is very critical. She finds that lawyer-drafted
contracts are often unnecessarily long and complicated.26 They
frequently have ambiguities that allow for multiple interpretations. 27
Sometimes parties decide to leave matters uncertain. This way, each side
has an argument in any potential litigation. Had they tried to negotiate
the matter, they might have been forced to accept a clear rejection of
their position. Moreover, some terms are hard to define precisely, and
parties may read a term differently. It is far easier to state matters with
terms such as "material," "reasonable," and "best efforts" than to try to
give such matters a precise definition.2 8 Hill argues that uncertainty
increases the costs of litigation, and this creates a bond against
precipitous recourse to the courts. 29 Each side knows that if it starts a
24. John Flood, Lawyers as Sanctifiers: The Role of Elite Law Firms in InternationalBusiness
Transactions, 14 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 35, 65 (2007).
25. See Claire A. Hill, Why Contracts Are Written in "Legalese, " 77 CHi.-KENT L. REV. 59

(2001); Claire A. Hill & Christopher King, How Do German Contracts Do as Much with Fewer
Words?, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 889 (2004).

26. Hill & King, supranote 25, at 894.
27. See Claire A. Hill, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Lawsuit: A Social Norms Theory of
Incomplete Contracts, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 191,194 (2009) [hereinafter Bargainingin the Shadow of
the Lawsuit].

28. Id. at 209.
29. Id. at 208. She also notes: "Whether a dispute arises depends largely on whether one or
both parties becomes unhappy in the relationship, which often turns on the world changing in the
way the parties did not expressly anticipate, and in a manner that they did not, and could not, have
comprehensively and satisfactorily provided for before the fact. More effort put towards drafting
within any reasonable range is not likely to ameliorate the problem commensurate with the added
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lawsuit, the other will be able to impose significant costs because
"[w]hat the murky contract does is lower the costs for the party being
sued... to countersue. '' 30 We can only wonder how far, if at all, the
move to putting standard terms on computers makes contracts less
murky and decreases cost barriers to litigation. Of course, even if the
language of the contract document is relatively precise, often people can
make arguments about the facts of the case if not the meaning of the
applicable rules of law.
If some law firms or corporate legal departments do not invest in
keeping computerized standard forms up to date, the courts may be
asked to interpret fuzzy language or fill gaps. If judges become more
aware of what Motorola's former general counsel called "knowledge
reuse," 31 how will the judges respond? At one time, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit refused to invest much effort in relieving
major businesses from a literal reading of the text of their contract
documents. 32 The court noted: "This policy of upholding the integrity of
written contracts and favoring written terms over extrinsic evidence is
particularly relevant in cases of this nature involving a written contract
between two large corporations presumably represented by competent
counsel. 3 3 Of course, it would be easy to offer examples of courts
helping large corporations "presumably represented by competent
counsel. 3 4
Let us assume that the conditions of modem law practice may
discourage innovation, and those lawyers who plan transactions are not
watching appellate reports and responding quickly with contract
revisions. What about lawyers influencing clients to at least make some
pretense of complying with the law? Gulati and Scott's story at least
suggests that a law firm would have to find a way to get a client to ask
for such service so that the firm could bill for it.35 Big firms do write
newsletters for potential clients, and these documents often suggest that
the firm can ward off the monster of regulation rising from the deep to
cost." Id. at 217. See also Albert Choi & George Triantis, Strategic Vagueness in Contract Design:
The Case of Corporate Acquisitions, 119 YALE L.J. 848, 891 (2010) ("A vague clause.., imposes
litigation costs on the parties, and when that cost is nontrivial, it can selectively eliminate the parties'
incentive to litigate ex post.").
30. Bargaining in the Shadow of the Lawsuit, supra note 27, at 213.
31. 1 WEISE, supra note 16, at 7-1.
32. See Binks Mfg. Co. v. Nat'l Presto Indus., Inc., 709 F.2d 1109, 1115-17 (7th Cir. 1983).
33. Id. at 1116. One of the lawyers for the buyer in Binks told me that the contract document
actually had been drafted by the firm's purchasing agent. He was a former high school teacher who
had no legal training.
34. See Mkt. St. Assocs. Ltd. P'ship v. Frey, 941 F.2d 588, 596-97 (7th Cir. 1991); Aluminum
Co. of Am. v. Essex Grp., Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53, 91-92 (W.D. Pa. 1980).
35. See GULATI & Scor-r, supra note I (manuscript at 108, 162-63).
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swallow the client's company. But we could well ask whether clients
read these documents and respond with a retainer. Gulati and Scott tell
us: "[L]awyers working in areas such as [mergers and acquisitions], tax
and private equity have suggested that our findings are idiosyncratic; that
their clients demand contract provisions that are carefully negotiated and
that every term is well understood by both client and lawyer."3 6 This
should prompt us to ask, what is it about these areas that is different
from the world of sovereign debt? In those other areas, have contract
documents been put into a computer database? If they have been
downloaded, how can a firm bill to keep up with judicial decisions and
other changes in the world that might call for research and redrafting of
various provisions? Perhaps, we might wonder whether these lawyers
that "every term is well
working in these other areas are correct
37
understood by both client and lawyer.,
Lawyers have innovated in the not too distant past. Gulati and Scott
point to the fashioning of "poison pill" structures that make hostile
takeovers less attractive. 38 Lauren Edelman and her co-authors report
that employment lawyers set up various internal procedures to help
employers cope with the developing legal limitations on their powers to
hire and fire at will. 39 Also, those who teach contracts are well aware of
the arbitration ploy that lawyers have crafted to undercut various
consumer protection and employee rights victories of the 1960s and
1970s. 40 Arbitration triggers all of our assumptions about alternative
dispute resolution and decisions by experts, rather than jurors and judges
with little knowledge of the context of a dispute. However, the lawyer
who dreamed up the provisions used by Gateway computers created a
structure that served to allow Gateway to come close to selling its
computers "as is" and "with all faults" without disclosing this
information. 4 1 The lawyer's innovation also created a whole new area of
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id. (manuscript at 177).
Id.
Id. (manuscript at 164-65).
See Lauren B. Edelman, Legal Environments and Organizational Governance: The

Expansion of Due Process in the American Workplace, 95 AM. J. Soc. 1401, 1412, 1435 (1990)

[hereinafter Legal Environments and Organizational Governance]; Lauren B. Edelman et al.,
Professional Construction of Low: The Inflated Threat of Wrongful Discharge, 26 LAW & SOC'Y
REv. 47,75-77 (1992).
40. See Legal Environments and Organizational Governance, supra note 39, at 1405-07.
41. See Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1148-50 (7th Cir. 1997). Paul D.
Carrington discussed the problem in depth. See Paul D. Carrington, Unconscionable Lawyers, 19
GA. ST. U. L. REv. 361, 385-86, 391 (2002) ("1 conclude by toasting the lawyer who is the first to
risk his professional energy and reputation to impose a substantial liability on an unconscionable
law firm for writing unconscionable terms into a standard form contract."). But see Eric J.
Mogilnicki & Kirk D. Jensen, Arbitration and Unconscionability, 19 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 761, 786-
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litigation and appeals when his Gateway clause was found to be
unconscionable.42
Whatever we think of creating arbitration as a way to blunt
individual rights, we can ask how lawyers learned about both the
possibilities of arbitration and the costs of having to battle
unconscionability cases. We can also ask how all of this legal activity on
both sides was financed. Do practices in large law firms allow for similar
innovations in the future? How would a firm get clients to pay for
something such as this? Elite law firms have moved to outsourcing much
work formerly done by young associates. Indeed, a firm based in India
has moved activities to Texas where it hires American lawyers as
temporary workers at much less than the salaries typically paid to
associates in large law firms. 43 However, it has been reported that a few
elite lawyers have been able to raise fees to over $1000 an hour.44 We
can ask what kinds of services command this price from which clients?
Are these lawyers concerned with coping with legal regulation by
standard form contracts? Do these high fees suggest that other areas will
not command services at this price? Gulati and Scott tell us: "Law firms
have ceded much of the production of innovative transactions to non-law
organizations, such as investment banks, marketing consultants and
commodities exchanges., 45 Nicholas Argyres and Kyle J. Mayer argue
that the best design of commercial contracts entails involving the
knowledge of engineers and managers as well as lawyers, although too
often contract drafting is left to the lawyers.46 If those other than lawyers
see drafting better contracts as worth the effort, we will see a new kind

87 (2003) ("Lawyers who advise businesses on dispute resolution issues can and should not only
advise clients that pre-dispute arbitration provisions are valid and enforceable under law, but also
identify the concerns raised by critics of arbitration and seek to address them.").
42. See Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 569, 574-75 (App. Div. 1998). See also
Stephen A. Broome, An UnconscionableApplication of the UnconscionabilityDoctrine: How the
California Courts Are Circumventing the FederalArbitration Act, 3 HASTINGS Bus. L.J. 39, 44-48

(2006); Anthony Niblett, Tracking Inconsistent Judicial Behavior 10-12 (July 2010) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://ssm.com/abstract= 1434685.
43. Heather Timmons, Where Lawyers Find Work, N.Y. TIMES, June 3,2011, at Bi. See also
John Markoff, Armies of Expensive Lawyers, Replaced by Cheaper Software, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5,
2011, at A I("Now, thanks to advances in artificial intelligence, 'e-discovery' software can analyze
documents in a fraction of the time for a fraction of the cost[I" of "a platoon of lawyers and
paralegals.").
44. Vanessa O'Connell, Big Law's $1,000-Plus an Hour Club, WALL ST. J., Feb. 23,2011, at
BI.
45.

GULATI & Scorr, supra note I (manuscript at 181).

46. Nicholas Argyres & Kyle J. Mayer, ContractDesign As a Firm Capability:An Integration
of Learning and Transaction Cost Perspectives, 32 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 1060, 1065-66 (2007).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2014

9

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 1 [2014], Art. 4

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40:25

of innovation. However, the following passage captures what I have
found to be the attitude of many business people:
Bruce considered Ross a tremendously smart man, which was a mixed
blessing in a lawyer; the smarter lawyers are, the more sides to a
question they see, and the more complicated they want to make
everything. Bruce drew a distinction between his world of "business
points" and Ross's realm of "legal points." The former had to do with
money in the here and now: who spent what, who got how much. The
latter had to do largely with the what-ifs, the potential for things to go
wrong and the remedies and sanctions that could be applied. It wasn't
that Bruce didn't believe that things could go wrong. On the contrary,
he knew that thousands of things would go wrong, most of them totally
unpredictable, unforeseen, and beyond the scope of even the most
comprehensive legal draftsmanship. And in that case the solution
would be found in the real world and not in the carefully crafted and
scrupulously numbered paragraphs of the agreements. Ultimately he
would be thrown back on his own resources, to rant and deal as best he
pretending otherwise struck him as an
could. To spend $200 an hour
47
expensive form of voodoo.
II.

A FEw ADMIRING COMMENTS ABOUT METHOD

Gulati and Scott write, I hope with a smile on their faces: "We
attempt to shed light on the question of sticky boilerplate using what will
undoubtedly strike some readers as a naive technique. 4 8 If we accept the
authority of the Concise Oxford English Dictionary, "naive" means
"natural and unaffected., 49 But it also refers to a kind of art that "has a
bold directness resembling a child's work. 5 ° While I would say that this
study "has a bold directness," it is far too sophisticated to ever be seen as
child-like in any way.
What is the problem when we ask questions of the leaders of a
tribe? Our informants may not know the answer, but they may be unable
to concede this. After all, they were asked the question because they
47. JERRY ADLER, HIGH RISE: How 1,000 MEN AND WOMEN WORKED AROUND THE CLOCK
FOR FIVE YEARS AND LOST $200 MILLION BUILDING A SKYSCRAPER 206 (1993). Some of the same

attitude is reflected in a Dilbert cartoon. Dilbert complains to the representative of a vendor that his
contract document is in "incomprehensible weaseleze[.]" Scott Adams, DILBERT (Sept. 15, 2001),
200
1-09 -15. Dilbert then says: "My only choices are to sign
http://www.dilbert.comlstrips/comic/
something I don't understand or get my lawyer involved and miss my deadline!" Id.
48. GULATI & ScoTr, supra note I (manuscript at 18).
49. CONCISE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 949 (1 Ithed. 2008).
50. Id. I have to concede that the Concise Oxford English Dictionary also offers as a
definition: "lacking experience, wisdom, or judgement." Id. Those terms also do not apply to Gulati
and Scott in any way.
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were supposed to know the answer. They may make up an answer that
sounds plausible, but it is inaccurate. They may want to entertain the
person asking questions, and so they may draw on the most unusual or
shocking story they know. The atypical may be offered as what happens
every day. Moreover, Gulati and Scott are law professors of some
reputation. 51 They wanted to know why their lawyer informants had
failed to do something. Just by asking the question, Gulati and Scott may
have conveyed the idea that they thought that the lawyers should have
done something about the Belgian court's interpretation of the pari
passu clause. Many of the senior lawyers sidestepped the researchers'
questions by offering "origin stories. 52 If only we knew, they said, why
the clause first appeared in sovereign debt contracts, we would
understand its purpose and what role it might play today. 53 Gulati and
Scott accepted this challenge. They traced the clause back in history, but
this did not produce a great revelation.
Gulati and Scott challenged their informants by asking them about
the various theories explaining the stickiness of contract terms. 54 They
looked at the explanations and tested them against the facts that they
gathered. 55 They did a major piece of detective work, tracing the history
of contracts with pari passu clauses.56 They found differences in the
language used in these clauses, and there were minor changes from time
to time.57 To put it mildly, Gulati and Scott were not about to accept
what they were told just because of the authority of their interviewees.
Even their final conclusions are set off with caveats. They offer a
qualified explanation for contract stickiness that may not apply to
everyone involved in sovereign debt or to other fields.
Perhaps readers who might see the research method as naive would
worry about other threats to validity. The authors used the so-called
"snowball" technique of finding informants.58 They knew Lawyer A and
talked with him. Lawyer A sent them to Lawyer B, who, in turn, sent
them to Lawyer C. This is a good way to find those few who know
something about an area. However, it risks being confined to those who
"are in the club." We have to question whether Lawyer A would send
51. See Frances Presma, Mitu Gulati: A 'Renaissance Man' in Law, DUKE TODAY (Oct. 26,
2006), available at http:lltoday.duke.edu/2006/10/gulati.htm; Robert E. Scott, COLUMBIA LAW
SCH., http://www.law.columbia.edu/fac/RobertScott (last visited Mar. 1, 2012).
52.

GULATI & Scorr, supra note I (manuscript at 90-91).

53. See id. (manuscript at 91).
54. See id. (manuscript at 65-66).
55. See id. (manuscript at 156-68).
56. See id. (manuscript at 134-55).
57. See id. (manuscript at 155).
58. Id. (manuscript at 66).
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you to Lawyer Z, who Lawyer A does not respect or who is known to do
things very differently than Lawyer A's practices. However, Gulati and
Scott interviewed so many lawyers that it seems likely that if Lawyer A
would never send them to Lawyer Z, Lawyers M, N, or 0 probably
would have done so if there was any reason to think that Lawyer Z could
add to the story. 59
Furthermore, if one is interviewing lawyers, she or he faces the
problem of secrecy. Part of this may be related to the attorney-client
privilege. Part may just be most lawyers' caution in talking about the
private dealings of clients. As a result, you seldom can identify
respondents in the report of the study. We must trust Gulati and Scott
when they tell us that they interviewed a large portion of the important
players in the sovereign debt game. 60 Both the "snowball" technique and
not revealing the identity of the informants means that, as Gulati and
Scott acknowledge, other scholars might be hard pressed to replicate
their work.6'
Many would feel more comfortable with hard data derived from a
true random sample analyzed with state of the art statistics. However,
questions about the practices of elite lawyers seldom, if ever, could be
answered this way. I can only smile at the reaction that I would expect if
I were to send these people a lengthy questionnaire without a promise of
anonymity. These lawyers are not college sophomores required to gain
experimental points. These lawyers are extremely busy people, and they
work in a world where their valuable time is billed to wealthy clients.
They usually will be flattered to be asked their opinion as experts in the
matter, but some, at least, see law professors as not true professionals.
We are the sports reporters while they are the players who take the field
and play the game. We watch while they do things that count. Of course,
some lawyers enjoy educating professors who remind them of those who
gave them so much trouble in law school.62 As I read The Three and a
Half Minute Transaction,I was impressed by how well the authors dealt
with all of these concerns. If we are going to study elite lawyers, this
study represents the state of the art.
I also want to applaud all of the hard work that went into this
project. Gulati and Scott worked for almost six years to produce the

59. See id.
60. Id. (manuscript at 117).
61. See id. (manuscript at 66).
62. After I spent more than an hour with a lawyer asking many questions, he walked with me
out to my car. As we arrived at the car, he said that he knew something that I did not know. "I'll bet
that you don't know who gave me my lowest grade in law school. You did!"
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manuscript. 63 They talked to more than 100 senior professionals working
in the field of sovereign debt. 64 They interviewed more than a dozen less
senior associates to be sure that people at their level were unlikely to
decide what to do with the pari passu clause.65 Gulati and Scott together
did most of the interviews in New York.66 Gulati did others at sovereign
debt conferences in London, Paris, and Frankfurt.67 Those who have
never tried to interview elite lawyers should stop and think about the
amount of work involved. Each interview had to be arranged, and this
meant coordinating the schedules of at least three people in most cases.
Afterwards, notes had to be transcribed and then analyzed. 68 What their
informants had said was challenged by what Gulati and Scott had
learned from analyzing the text of their large collection of sovereign debt
contracts and the practices in the industry. All of this took more time and
effort. Then the pair of authors had to find a way to write and polish a
manuscript. Gulati told me how much he enjoyed working with Scott.
Collaborations do not always produce pleasant memories such as this.
In an e-mail, Gulati told me that 176 pages was a lot to read
regarding "a story about an obscure case and [a] three-line contract
provision., 69 Gulati is an extremely nice person (so is Scott), and he did
not want to blow his own horn. However, The Three and a Half Minute
Transactionis a very important achievement. It has something to say to
those who study contracts and those concerned with learning more about
an important part of the legal profession. It is fairly easy to read a
collection of appellate opinions and apply your imagination or the theory
in which you have placed your faith. Do not get me wrong-reading
cases is important. It is just not enough. Appellate courts play a
significant part in dealing with only a tiny portion of all of the
economically important contracts formed in any nation. Appellate courts
offer default rules, fill in gaps, and, at times, play games to get the
"right" result. Often, the major function of actual and potential litigation
and appeals is to coerce the parties to settle. Much of the work is done by
those who produce contracts, and often these are collections of standard
form clauses. Not infrequently the lawyers' work is affected by the
63. GULATI & Scorr, supra note I (manuscript at 9, 64).
64. Id. (manuscript at 65).
65. Id. (manuscript at 66).
66. Id. (manuscript at 64).
67. Id. (manuscript at 60).
68. Id. (manuscript at 66). The authors tell us: "Our initial plan had been to tape the
interviews. But the reluctance of the initial respondents to permit taping led us to abandon that
course of action." Id. This was my experience interviewing lawyers as well.
69. E-mail from Mitu Gulati to author (June 11, 2011, 9:30 EST) (on file with the Hofstra
Law Review).
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attitudes of business people and engineers. They often have little respect
for the lawyers' concern with what they see as unlikely contingencies.
As Gulati and Scott report, now elite law firms and major corporations
have moved much of the effort to clauses embalmed in a database on a
computer. 7 What positives and negatives are likely to flow from this?
We need a new legal realism to understand the disputes that get through
all of the filters and make it into the courts. 7 ' Gulati and Scott have made
a real contribution for all of us who try to teach law students something
about what lawyers do in relation to our subject and what difference it
might make.

70. See GULATI & ScoTr, supra note 1 (manuscript at 104).
71. See Stewart Macaulay, Contracts, New Legal Realism, and Improving the Navigation of
The Yellow Submarine, 80 TuL. L. REv. 1161, 1166 (2006); Stewart Macaulay, The New Versus the
Old Legal Realism: "Things Ain't What They Used to Be," 2005 Wis. L. REv. 365, 385-86.
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